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    We demonstrate the general applicability of the elastic block cipher method by constructing 
examples from existing block ciphers: AES, Camellia, MISTY1 and RC6. An elastic block cipher 
is a variable-length block cipher created from an existing fixed-length block cipher. The elastic 
version supports any block size between one and two times that of the original block size. We 
compare the performance of the elastic versions to that of the original versions and evaluate the 
elastic versions using statistical tests measuring the randomness of the ciphertext. The benefit,  in 
terms of an increased rate of encryption, of using an elastic block cipher varies based on the spe-
cific block cipher and implementation. In most cases, there is an advantage to using an elastic 
block cipher  to encrypt blocks that are a few bytes longer than the original block length. The sta-
tistical test results indicate no obvious flaws in the method for constructing elastic block ciphers. 
We also use our examples to demonstrate the concept of a generic key schedule for block ciphers. 
In addition, we present ideas for new modes of encryption using the elastic block cipher construc-
tion. 
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1  Introduction
We illustrate the method for creating elastic block ciphers with four constructions. Elastic block 
ciphers are variable-length block ciphers created from existing block ciphers [5]. The elastic ver-
sion of a block cipher supports any block size between one and two times that of the original 
block size. The method consists of a substitution-permutation network that uses the round func-
tion from the existing fixed-length block cipher. In this work, we construct elastic block ciphers 
from AES [13], Camellia [1], MISTY1 [8 ] and RC6 [17], to serve as examples of the general 
applicability of the method. We analyze the randomness of the cipher's output using standard sta-
tistical tests and evaluate the performance of the elastic versions. We also use our constructions to 
illustrate the use of a generic key schedule for block ciphers. Additionally, we propose how the 
method can be used to create new modes of encryption.  
Our performance tests demonstrate that the benefit of using an elastic block cipher varies based 
on the specific block cipher and implementation. In most cases, there is an increased rate of en-
cryption when using an elastic block cipher to encrypt blocks a few bytes longer than the original 
1 This work was completed while the author was at Columbia University.
block length as opposed to padding the data to two full blocks. The statistical tests applied to the 
block ciphers do not prove a cipher is secure but instead serve as a sanity check to determine if 
there are design flaws in the cipher. The test results for the elastic versions are consistent with 
those of the original ciphers and indicate no obvious flaws in the method for constructing elastic 
block ciphers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our four construc-
tions, including the use of a generic key schedule. In Section 3, we propose ideas for new modes 
of encryption. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2  Elastic Block Cipher Examples
2.1 Overview
We briefly review our method for creating elastic block ciphers [5]. Our method converts the en-
cryption and decryption functions of any existing block cipher, G, that accepts blocks of size b 
bits to a variable-length block cipher, G', that accepts block sizes of b+y bits, where 0 ≤  y ≤  b. 
Figure 1 shows the general structure of an elastic block cipher.  The round function of G' is a cy-
cle of G, where a cycle is the sequence in which all b bits have been processed by the round func-
tion of G.  For example, in AES the round function is a cycle. If G is a Feistel  network, a cycle is 
the sequence of applying the round function of G to the left and right halves of the b bit block. In 
each round of G', the leftmost b  bits are processed by the round function and the rightmost y bits 
are omitted from the round function. Afterwards, the rightmost y bits are XORed with a subset of 
y bits from the leftmost b bits and the results swapped. What y bits are chosen from the leftmost b 
bits for use in the swap step may vary per round. The swap step is omitted after the last round. 
The number of rounds in G' is r’ = r + (ry)/b  where r is the number of cycles in G. The elastic 
version also includes initial and end-of-round whitening on all b+y bits, and an initial and final 
key-dependent permutation that processes all b+y bits. 
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Figure 1: Elastic Block Cipher Structure
b bits y bits
In the remainder of this section we describe the elastic versions of AES, Camellia, MISTY1 and 
RC6. We choose these particular block ciphers because they were finalists in standards competi-
tions that represent different methods for how the round function process bits. AES serves as the 
simplest example for creating an elastic block cipher because its round function processes the 
entire 128-bit block in each application. Camellia, one of the recommended 128-bit block ciphers 
from NESSIE's competition for cryptographic algorithms [10], is a Feistel network with an addi-
tional function applied after certain cycles. MISTY1, the recommended 64-bit block cipher from 
NESSIE, is also structured as a Feistel network. Its elastic version provides an example of a ci-
pher covering blocks in the range of 64 to 128 bits.  RC6, a finalist from the AES competition, 
breaks the data block into quarters and the round function updates two of the quarters using the 
values of the other  two quarters. We use a 128-bit version of RC6. 
2.2 Common Items
We first describe implementation details shared by the four examples.  In the elastic versions of 
block ciphers, the bits in a block of  data are numbered from the most significant (leftmost) to the 
least significant (rightmost). Bits 1 to b become the b-bit portion and bits b+1 to b+y become the 
y-bit portion. The initial and final key-dependent permutations perform a byte or word level rota-
tion combined with a swapping of any fractional byte of data. Two expanded-key bytes are util-
ized by each of the permutations. The amount of the rotation depends on an expanded-key byte. 
When the block size is not an integral number of bytes or words, the rightmost fractional byte or 
word is omitted from the rotation and swapped with bits from the rotation's result. A second 
expanded-key byte determines the byte or word from which bits are swapped with the fractional 
byte. If the block size is an integral number of bytes or words, this second expanded-key byte is 
unused. RC4 [18] was used for the key schedule. The first 512 bytes of RC4's output are dis-
carded [9], then RC4 is run until the required amount of expanded key bytes are obtained. How 
the bits are selected for the swap steps varies slightly among our constructions. In all cases, the 
bits swapped out of the b-bit portion at the end of the round are y sequential bits (circling back to 
the leftmost bit after reaching the rightmost bit), but the starting position of this sequence varies 
per cipher. As shown in [4], the exact positions of the bits swapped does not matter in the sense 
that the elastic version will be secure against any attack that works by recovering key or round 
key bits if the original cipher is secure against the attack regardless of the bit positions chosen for 
each swap step.
For each cipher, we compared the performance of the elastic version to the original version with 
padding. We measured the rate of encryption for each block size that is an integral number of 
bytes. This excludes the time to expand the key. In the elastic implementations, when the block 
size is not an integral number of bytes, the fractional byte is stored in a byte and the processing 
time is the same as if a full byte of data is present; therefore, the time to encrypt b+y bits is the 
time to encrypt (b+y)/8  bytes. It is possible for the computational workload to vary at a more 
granular level, such as in a hardware implementation. The time for the fixed-length version to 
encrypt a (b+y)-bit block is the time to encrypt 2b bits in order to represent the padding required 
when using a b-bit block cipher. We measured the time to encrypt one million (b+y)-bit blocks, 
where 0 ≤  y ≤  b and y is an integer multiple of 8, using the elastic version and two million b-bit 
blocks using the fixed-length version. The time to pad the data was not included when measuring 
the performance of the original cipher. We implemented all the ciphers in C. All tests were con-
ducted on a 2.8Ghz  Pentium 4 processor with 1GB RAM running Redhat Linux 2.4.22, unless 
otherwise noted. 
We also compared the performance of the elastic versions to the performance of two previous 
proposals for variable-length block ciphers. The first proposal is by Bellare and Rogaway [2]. 
Their method involves running an existing block cipher, G, in CBC mode under one key, encrypt-
ing the last block of output from the CBC mode with G using a second key and using its output as 
an IV into G run in counter mode using  third key. The ciphertext is the IV for the counter mode 
concatenated with the result of XORing the output from counter mode with the plaintext minus 
the last block. The second proposal is a modification by Patel, Ramzan and Sundarama to the first 
method that replaces the CBC portion with a hash function [15]. We used SHA-256 [14] as the 
hash function. Both proposals are less efficient than padding the plaintext to two full blocks and 
encrypting with a fixed-length block cipher, and both do not vary the workload for plaintext that 
is between one and two blocks in length. Bellare and Rogaway's method requires slightly more 
than twice the work of using fixed-sized, b-bit blocks for any (b+y)-bit block, where 0 < y ≤ b. 
Patel's method requires two full applications of the block cipher plus the cost of a hash function to 
encrypt b+y bits.
2.3 Elastic AES
We created the elastic version of AES by adding the swap step between rounds of AES, expand-
ing AES's whitening steps (AddRoundKey) from b = 128 bits to 128+y bits, and adding the ini-
tial and final key-dependent permutations. The round function consists of AES’s SubBytes, Shif-
trows and MixColumns steps, with the MixColumns step omitted in the last round to be consis-
tent with the fixed-length version of AES [13]. The number of rounds ranges from 10 when y = 0 
to 20 when 116 ≤ y ≤ 128. We implemented the swap step by selecting y sequential bits from the 
leftmost b bits, wrapping around from the right to the left as needed. The starting position is var-
ied by moving one byte to the right each round to avoid using the same bit positions in each swap. 
This avoids any complex selection process for choosing the y bits that would decrease perform-
ance. 
We implemented two elastic versions of AES that differed in how the round function was imple-
mented. In Version I, we implemented the round function as a straightforward sequence of the 
SubBytes, Shiftrows and MixColumns steps as defined in [13]. In Version II, we combined these 
steps into a table lookup. This results in the round function being a series of byte-level table look-
ups and XORs. Version II requires fewer CPU cycles than Version I, at the cost of an increase in 
memory usage. The round function can also be implemented to process the data as 32-bit words, 
in which case the table entries are 32-bit words. We kept table lookups at the byte level because 
we chose to implement the key-dependent permutations and swap step at the byte level.  
The elastic versions increase the number of operations beyond the 128-bit versions due to the 
swap steps, the two key-dependent permutations and the expansion of whitening to cover 128+y 
its. In Version I, the elastic version saves processing time over padding. Obviously, as the block 
size approaches two full blocks, 20 rounds of AES are incurred in the elastic version along with 
the added steps, which increases the number of operations beyond the 20 rounds of AES that are 
required when padding the data to two full blocks. Therefore, it is expected that there is no per-
formance benefit when encrypting blocks just under 32 bytes.  In Version II, the elastic version 
does not offer a performance benefit compared to padding. This is because of the simplistic nature 
of the operations involved (table lookups and XORs) for the round function. Even though there 
are fewer rounds in the elastic version than with padding, the operations for the swap step and the 
two key-dependent permutations consume any savings gained from having fewer rounds. How-
ever, Version II offers a performance benefit over the variable-length block cipher construction by 
Bellare and Rogaway, and its modification by Patel, et al.
Figure 2: Normalized # of Blocks Encrypted by Elastic AES in Unit Time 
(Regular AES = 100)}
Figure 2  summarizes the results from the following three cases: Case 1: Version I tested on a 1.3 
Ghz Pentium 4 processor with 512MB RAM running Windows XP, Case 2: Version I tested in the 
Linux environment described in Section 2.2. Case 3: Version II tested in the Linux environment 
described in Section 2.2.  In the first trial, the number of (b+y)-bit blocks the elastic version can 
encrypt per second ranges from 190% of the number of 2b-bit blocks AES can encrypt per second 
when y=1 to 100% when y = 97. Then the elastic version's performance decreased gradually to a 
low of 83% of AES's rate. In the second trial, the values ranged from 186% to 69% of AES's rate, 
with the elastic version becoming slower than the fixed-length version when y = 73. In the third 
trial, the elastic version was slower than the fixed-sized version with padding for all block sizes.   
We compared Bellare and Rogaway's method and Patel's method to AES with padding on the 
Pentium 4 processor used in cases 2 and 3. Bellare and Rogaway's method encrypted between 49 
and 50 (b+y)-bit blocks in the same amount of time AES with padding encrypted 100 blocks, for 
both Version I and II of AES. Patel's method encrypted 96 (b+y)-bit blocks in the time it took 
Version I of AES to encrypt 100 blocks, and encrypted 18 (b+y)-bit blocks in the time it took Ver-
sion II of AES to encrypt 100 blocks. When using Version I, elastic AES is computationally more 
efficient than both Bellare and Rogaway's method and Patel's method for all block sizes. When 
using Version II, elastic AES is computationally more efficient than Bellare and Rogaway's 
method for block sizes up to 21 bytes in length, and is more efficient than Patel's method for 
block sizes less than 31 bytes and is as efficient as Patel's method for block sizes between 31 and 
32 bytes.
2.4 Elastic Camellia
Camellia processes 128-bit blocks and is a Feistel network with additional steps. A function, re-
ferred to as the FL function, is applied after every three cycles in the Feistel network, except after 
the last three cycles. FL is applied to the left half and its inverse is applied to right half of the 
b=128 bits. Camellia contains initial and final whitening steps, but not end-of-round whitening. 
Creating the elastic version involved using a cycle from the Feistel network as the round function, 
expanding the two existing whitening steps  to cover 128+y bits and adding end-of-round whiten-
ing steps to all the  other rounds, and adding the same initial and final key-dependent  permuta-
tions that we used in elastic AES. We apply the FL function after every three rounds, except for 
the last round. A round of the elastic version is shown in Figure 3. The data is processed as bytes. 
The swap step was implemented by altering the starting positions between the left and right 
halves of the b-bit portion then rotating it one byte to the right within the half. Camellia has 9 cy-
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Figure 3: Round Function for Elastic Camellia
Figure 4: Normalized #of Blocks Encrypted by Elastic Camellia in Unit 
Time (Regular Camellia = 100)}
The elastic version offered no performance gain over the fixed-length version with padding. We 
also measured the performance of the elastic version without the initial and final permutations. 
Removing these two steps results  in the elastic version offering a performance benefit when en-
crypting blocks that are one to three bytes over the normal 16-byte block size. Results for the fol-
lowing two cases are shown in Figure 4: Case 1: elastic Camellia with all steps, Case 2: elastic 
Camellia without the initial and final key-dependent permutations. By using a lower bound of 
twice the work of padding for Bellare and Rogaway's method, elastic Camellia with the key-
dependent permutations provides a performance benefit for block sizes up to 22 bytes and the 
version without the key-dependent permutations provides a performance benefit for block sizes in 
the range of 9 to 25 bytes compared to Bellare and Rogaway's method. Patel's method encrypted 
61 (b+y)-bit blocks, 0 < y ≤  b, in the time it took Camellia with padding to encrypt 100 blocks. 
Elastic Camellia is more efficient than Patel's method for block sizes up to 21 bytes and 23 bytes, 
respectively, for the two cases. 
2.5 Elastic MISTY1
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher structured as a Feistel network with an additional function, 
called the FL function (not to be confused with the  FL function from Camellia), applied once per 
cycle. While the number of cycles is not fixed, four cycles are recommended [10] and is the num-
ber upon which we base the number of rounds in the elastic version. MISTY1 does not contain 
whitening steps. A cycle from MISTY1 is used as the round function in the elastic version, shown 
in Figure 5. Creating the elastic version involved adding the whitening steps, the initial and final 
key-dependent permutations and the swapping of bits after each cycle. The data is processed as 
32-bit words. The key-dependent permutations are of the same form (a rotation and swap) as 
those used in the other three elastic block cipher examples. We alternate the starting position for 
the swap between the left and right halves of the round's output and, within each halve, rotate the 
starting position one word each time.
                          
Figure 5: Round Function for Elastic MISTY1
We implemented elastic versions, with and without the key-dependent permutations, and the 
regular version of MISTY1. The performance results are shown in Figure 6. Case 1 refers to the 
version with the key-dependent permutations and Case 2 refers to the version without the key-
dependent permutations. The elastic versions increased the number of operations beyond the 64-
bit version of MISTY1 due to the whitening, the swap steps and, in one version, the key-
dependent permutations. The elastic version of MISTY1 provides a performance benefit com-
pared to padding for blocks that are one to four bytes over the 8-byte block size that MISTY1 
processes. The benefit increases significantly in Case 2 compared to Case 1 for block sizes that 
are up to one additional byte over MISTY1's 8-byte block size. The performance benefit from 
removing the initial and final key permutations decreases as the block size increases because they 
represent an increasingly smaller portion of the operations as more rounds are added. In both 
cases, the elastic version provides a performance benefit when compared to Bellare and Roga-
way's method based on a lower bound of twice the work of padding for their method. Patel's 
method encrypted 51 (b+y)-bit blocks, 0 < y  ≤ b, in the time it took MISTY1 with padding to 
encrypt 100 blocks using padding. Both cases of the elastic version of MISTY1 encrypt at a faster 
rate than Patel's method for all block sizes between 8 and 16 bytes.
Figure 6: Normalized # of Blocks Encrypted by Elastic MISTY1 in Unit 
Time (Regular MISTY1 = 100)
2.6 Elastic RC6
RC6 is an example of a block cipher other than a Feistel network whose round function processes 
only a segment of the data block. RC6 divides a 128-bit data block into four 32-bit words, which 
we will refer to as ABCD. A and C are updated by the round function based on the values of B 
and D. At the end of the round, A and C have expanded-key bits added to them then all the words 
are rotated to the left one word. B and D have expanded-key bits added to them before the first 
round, and A and C have expanded-key bits added to them after the last round. The addition of 
expanded-key bits to a word is a type of whitening. Since this "whitening" does not cover the en-
tire data block and is not the same as performing whitening by XORing data with expanded-key 
bits, we view this addition as a step in the round function and not as whitening that should be ex-
panded to all b+y bits when forming the elastic version. A sequence of four applications of the 
round function of RC6 is a cycle and serves as the round function in the elastic version, as shown 
in Figure 7. Initial and end-of-round whitening, and the initial and final key-dependent permuta-
tions are also added to create the elastic version. The rotations and XOR in the initial and final 
permutations were performed at the word level this time instead of at the byte level as done in 
elastic AES and elastic Camellia. The number of cycles in RC6 for 128-bit blocks is 5  (20 appli-
cations of RC6's round function). The number of rounds in the elastic version ranges from 5 when 
y=0 to 10 when y=103 (20 to 40 applications of RC6's round function). The swap step was im-








Figure 7: Round of Elastic RC6 
The elastic version provides a performance benefit compared to padding for blocks of under 21 
bytes in length. The results shown in Figure 8. Using a lower bound of twice the work of padding 
for Bellare and Rogaway's method, the elastic version of RC6 provides a performance benefit for 
blocks under 30 bytes in length when compared to Bellare and Rogaway's method. Patel's method 
encrypted 52 blocks (b+y)-bit blocks, 0 < y ≤ b, in the time it took RC6 with padding to encrypt 
100 blocks. Elastic RC6 is more efficient than Patel's method for block sizes up to 29 bytes.  
Figure 8: Normalized # of Blocks Encrypted by Elastic RC6 in Unit Time 
(Regular RC6 = 100)
2.7 Randomness Test Results
We applied statistical tests used by NIST on the AES candidates to both the original and elastic 
versions of the four ciphers. While these tests do not  prove a cipher is secure, they do assist in 
determining if there are any  obvious weaknesses with the cipher. There are sixteen tests  per-
formed on eight sets of data for each cipher. Refer to NIST's special  publication 800-22 [12] for a 
description of the tests and to the NIST report entitled "Randomness Testing of the Advanced En-
cryption Standard Finalist Candidates" [11] for a  description of the data sets. We tested every 
(b+y)-bit block size where  y is an integral of 8 and b ≤  b+y ≤ 2b. We also tested two block sizes 
that were not an integral number of bytes. These were 129-bit and 171-bit blocks for the elastic 
round 
function
versions of AES, Camellia and RC6, and 69-bit and 75-bit blocks for the elastic version of 
MISTY1.   We used 128-bit keys in all of our tests. Each data set required either an initial set of 
random plaintexts or  random keys. We created these random bit strings by extracting bits from 
files of random bits available from random.org [16].  Based on the results, each of our three elas-
tic block cipher examples show  no signs of any statistical weakness compared to the original ci-
phers. In the AES competition, finalists passed each test at a rate of 96.33% or higher [11]. The 
elastic versions of the ciphers also met or exceeded this rate. For the elastic versions of the ci-
phers, the percentage of samples passing each test was consistent across all block sizes and data 
sets. 
2.8 Key Schedules
The key schedule for an elastic version of a block cipher has to generate more expanded-key bits 
than the key schedule of the original block cipher. Additional key bits are needed due to the ex-
pansion or addition of whitening steps, the two key-dependent mixing steps and the increase in 
the number of rounds. In practice, every block cipher includes its own key schedule, which is 
typically designed with a focus on performance and little concern about the lack of pseudoran-
domness in the expanded-key bits. This tendency in key schedule design results in key schedules 
contributing to attacks (due to the ease in which additional key bits can be determined once a few 
are found and by increasing the opportunity for related key attacks [3]) and forces applications 
supporting multiple block ciphers to support a separate key schedule for each cipher. When creat-
ing elastic block  ciphers, we wanted to avoid these disadvantages of existing key schedules. Fur-
thermore, unlike the encryption algorithms of block ciphers which follow a somewhat generic 
structure by being a series of rounds, key schedules vary extensively in their structures. This 
makes it unlikely a general method can be devised for modifying the key schedules to generate 
additional bits as needed based on the block size.  Therefore, we required a generic key schedule 
that is independent of the block cipher and that generates as many pseudorandom expanded-key 
bits (or close to pseudorandom) as needed while adhering to a performance bound. Existing 
stream ciphers are potential candidates for satisfying these requirements. We used RC4 as the key 
schedule in the elastic block ciphers to illustrate the concept of a generic key schedule satisfying 
these requirements.  The first 512 bytes of RC4's output are discarded due to a slight statistical 
weakness in the initial bytes output from RC4 [9]. We re-initialized RC4's "S" array is for each 
expanded key. A disadvantage of a generic key schedule is that if a weakness is discovered in the 
key schedule, it will impact any block cipher using the key  schedule. However, having one key 
schedule decreases the likeliness of overlooked design flaws and implementation errors compared 
to when multiple key schedules are required.
In contrast to RC4 and any other stream cipher used in practice, the key schedules of AES and 
Camellia generate expanded keys that can easily be distinguished from random bits. In AES,  an 
expanded-key byte is a combination of two other expanded-key bytes. When designing AES, 
Daemen and Rijmen noted the benefit of pseudorandom key bits, but stated that  they took a "less 
ambitious" approach focused on avoiding symmetry between rounds and attacks due to related 
keys because "All other attacks are supposed to be prevented by the rounds of the block cipher." 
[6], page 77. In Camellia, there is a large overlap amongst the round keys. In MISTY1, the same 
expanded key bits are used in multiple locations within the block cipher. In RC6, it is more diffi-
cult to determine key bits from other expanded-key bits compared to AES and Camellia. Each 
original key byte is altered with an addition and a rotation. The resulting byte is then added to a 
previous expanded-key byte and a constant to create the next expanded-key byte.  
Cipher Block Size in Bytes # of Rounds # of Expanded-Key Bytes
AES 16 10 180
AES 17 11 208
AES 32 20 676
Camellia 16 9 340
Camellia 17 10 383
Camellia 32 18 980
MISTY1 8 4 196
MISTY1 9 5 246
MISTY1 16 8 444
RC6 16 20 516
RC6 17 21 562
RC6 32 40 1652
Table 1: Number of Expanded Key Bytes in Elastic Versions
We compared the performance of RC4 when generating enough expanded key bits to encrypt a b-
bit block to the performance of the four ciphers' key schedules. When encrypting b bits, the num-
ber of expanded-key bits in an elastic block cipher is 32 more than the number in the original ci-
pher (due to the key-dependent permutations) plus the number of bits needed for any initial and/
or end-of-round whitening that was not in the original cipher.  Recall that whitening steps were 
added when forming the elastic versions of Camellia and RC6; whereas, AES already contained 
whitening and only required that its whitening steps be expanded to cover all b+y bits.
When measuring the performance of the original key schedules, we removed any statements from 
the original ciphers' key schedules that were present only for the support of key sizes other than 
128 bits. Specifically, we removed the statements from AES's key schedules that were for the 
support of 192 and 256-bit keys. We also compared each elastic block cipher’s key expansion rate 
to that of AES’s original key schedule because in practice AES’s key expansion  rate is presently 
accepted. Let ti, for i = 1,2,3,4, correspond to the key expansion rate for the fixed-length versions 
of AES, Camellia, MISTY1 and RC6, respectively. Table 1 shows the number of expanded-key 
bytes needed in the elastic block ciphers for block sizes of b, b+8 and 2b bits. The key-expansion 





Elastic Version’s Rate  (RC4) 
 vs  Fixed-Length Version’s Rate
Elastic Version’s Rate (RC4) 
vs Fixed-Length AES’s Rate
AES 16 5.94t1 5.94t1
Camellia 16 43.54t2 6.89t1
MISTY1 8 119.24t3 6.09t1
RC6 16 6.29t4 7.84t1
Table 2: Key Expansion Rate
We note that Camellia and MISTY1 have the fastest key schedule of the four ciphers  and also 
requires the most expanded-key bits, thus resulting in RC4  appearing to be significantly slower. 
However, Camellia's and MISTY1’s key schedules have the least amount of randomness of the 
four ciphers due to reusing expanded-key bits in multiple locations.  Overall, the RC4-based key 
expansion used in the elastic ciphers when encrypting b-bit blocks is just under six to just under 
eight times the rate of AES's key schedule.  
3  Modes of Encryption
3.1 Overview
An elastic block cipher can be used in existing modes of encryption in two ways. The first option 
is to use the block size of the original,   fixed-length block cipher for all blocks except the last 
block, then use a variable-length block at the end to avoid padding. A second option is to use a 
block size different from the fixed-length block cipher for all blocks, with the size of the last 
block set to avoid padding. When using an existing mode, the only benefit the elastic version of a 
cipher provides is the elimination of padding; it does not eliminate any existing attack against the 
mode. For short segments of data between one and two blocks, an elastic block cipher allows all 
of the bits to be encrypted as a single block, avoiding the need to use a mode of encryption and 
creating a stronger binding across the ciphertext bits compared to the ciphertext produced by a 
mode of encryption. Elastic block ciphers also allow for new modes of encryption. We provide a 
sketch of two new modes, Elastic Chaining and Elastic Electronic Code Book (Elastic ECB). 
Both modes are intended as initial ideas for future work.  
3.2 Elastic Chaining Mode
Elastic Chaining is depicted in Figure 9. y bits from the ith ciphertext block are prepended to the 
(i+1)st plaintext block and the result encrypted as a (b+y)-bit block. This concatenation creates a 
stronger binding between the ith and (i+1)st blocks compared to that created by the XOR used in 
CBC mode. The stronger binding is achieved by increasing the work per block from the number 
of rounds required for b bits to the number required for b+y bits, while the number of blocks is 
unchanged. The output consists of the leftmost b bits from each ciphertext block for all but the 
last block and the entire ciphertext of the last block. The first block to be encrypted can consist of 
b plaintext bits with a y-bit IV prepended to it, b+y plaintext bits, or contain only b plaintext bits. 
Overall, the ciphertext will be at most y bits longer than the plaintext. If the plaintext is not an 
integral number of b-bit blocks, the last  block may be shorter than b+y bits. When the plaintext is 
not an  integral number of b-bit blocks, the mode can be implemented without padding the last 
block; whereas, using the non-elastic version of the block cipher would require padding and also 
produce a ciphertext longer than the plaintext. The performance of the mode depends on the size 
of y. For a block cipher with r rounds, nr rounds are computed to encrypt n b-bit blocks with 
ECB, CBC or CTR mode. The number of rounds using elastic chaining will range from n(r+1) 
when y=1 to 2nr when (ry)/b = r. This mode is useful in applications where the decryption can 
start at the last block. For example, when decrypting a file or segments of a database.
The ciphertext can be decrypted by decrypting the last block, concatenating the y bits from the 
plaintext block with the previous ciphertext block, and then decrypting the next block. When us-
ing an IV with the first block, the IV is not needed for decryption; however, having it available for 
decryption provides a type of integrity check in that the first y bits of the resulting plaintext can be 
verified against the IV. 
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Figure 9: Elastic Chaining Mode
The mode allows for variations. These include altering which positions the y bits from the previ-
ous ciphertext block are inserted into in the current plaintext block. Instead of prepending the y 
bits to the next plaintext block, they could be appended or inserted amongst the b  bits as either y 
consecutive or nonconsecutive bits. The size of y can also vary between blocks, possibly based on 
the key value. 
This mode offers several security benefits because, even if the plaintext is known, an attacker 
does not know the actual (b+y)-bit block being encrypted. If y varies per block based on key ma-
terial, the attacker does not even know the length of each block being encrypted.  Incorporating 
the previous ciphertext block into the current plaintext block when encrypting will hide plaintext 
patterns. In the way the mode is depicted in Figure 9, a single bit toggled in the ciphertext is de-
tectable because it will garble all plaintext prior to and including the altered block. In order to 
insert or splice together ciphertext blocks, the inserted ciphertext block must decrypt to a plain-
text which produces the same leftmost y bits as the original ciphertext block; otherwise, all plain-
text blocks prior to this one will be garbled, resulting in a much more noticeable impact than the 
single garbled block produced by a splicing attack on CBC. Block-wise adaptive attacks [7], to 
which CBC is subject, are prevented because there is no need for the device performing the en-
cryption to output the last y bits of each ciphertext block, except for the last block. This prevents 
the attacker from knowing the actual block being encrypted because the attacker only gets to 
choose b bits of the b+y bit block and block-wise adaptive attacks depend on the attacker know-
ing the exact plaintext. 
To prepend blocks to the ciphertext, the attacker must be able to insert a ciphertext block that, 
when prepended to the leftmost y bits of the original first plaintext block will decrypt to some 
meaningful plaintext. Since these y bits are the IV, if the IV is not secret, the attacker will know 
what the y bits are and needs to find b bits that can be prepended to the y bits. However, notice 
that the attacker does not have a library of (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs from which to search for a 
possible b-bit value to prepend to the IV unless the entire plaintext is one block, in which case the 
mode is not necessary. The attacker will not have (b+y)-bit (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs from the 
(input, output) pairs of data encrypted with this mode because the leftmost y bits of the ciphertext 
are not included in the output except for the last block and the b+y input to the last block is not 
output
y bits
known. Appending blocks requires that the attacker append blocks of ciphertext which decrypt to 
a plaintext whose leftmost y bits are the same as the last y bits of the original ciphertext.  In both 
cases, the smaller y is, the more likely it is that the attacker can form meaningful blocks to pre-
pend or append, since there are only 2y values to try. If y or the bit positions used for the y bits 
vary per block based on the key, an attacker will need to try all values of y and possible positions 
for the y bits.  
 
It is not possible to rearrange ciphertext blocks without garbling the plaintext because y bits from 
each plaintext block are used to decrypt the previous plaintext block. In order to swap ciphertext 
block i with ciphertext block j, the attacker has to find a ciphertext block in position i which, 
when prepended to the leftmost y bits from the (j+1)st plaintext block, will decrypt to a plaintext 
block whose leftmost y bits are the same as the y bits appended to the (j-1)st  ciphertext block dur-
ing decryption. Likewise, the jth block must be such that when it is prepended to the leftmost y 
bits from the (i+1)st  plaintext block, will decrypt to a plaintext block whose leftmost y bits are 
the same as the y bits appended to the (i-1)st ciphertext block during decryption. Furthermore, be-
cause the  recipient of the ciphertext does not receive the rightmost y bits of each block except for 
the last block. The attacker does not even know all of the ciphertext bits used to decrypt a given 
block of plaintext when trying to determine what ciphertext blocks can be rearranged without 
garbling the message.
3.3 Elastic ECB Mode
Our second new mode, shown in Figure 10, is a possible alternative to ECB mode that offers 
some protection against pattern detection in and alterations of the ciphertext compared to ECB. In 
tests, Elastic ECB significantly reduced the number of patterns when encrypting data that has re-
peated plaintext blocks aligning on 16-byte boundaries [4]. The data is encrypted as in ECB 
mode, but the block size varies per block based on the key, as shown in Figure 10. The ith block is 
of length b + yi for 0 ≤ yi ≤ b and yi is based on key bits. The ith block can be decrypted without 
decrypting any other block by determining its starting position and length from the key. If the key 
bits are sufficiently random, yi will be uniformly random within [0,b]. Another option is to use 
key bits to set the first block's length then set each subsequent block size based on bits from the 
previous ciphertext block, although this will not allow the block lengths to be set in advance.
The ith block can start at any position in the range b(i-1) + 1 and 2b(i-1) + 1, with an average of 
(3b(i-1)+2)/2. For a plaintext pattern to show up in the ciphertext, the starting position of the 
block (which is now random) and yi would have to match the starting position of the plaintext 
pattern and its length in the file. This method does not work for all cases because there are b+1 
possible block sizes (b to 2b) if all values of y are used and (b/8)+1  possible block sizes if the 
block size must be an integral number of bytes. If the file is large enough and has a significant 
number of repeated entries, ciphertext repetitions will occur. The degenerate case is a file consist-
ing entirely of the same byte value repeated, in which case there will be b/8 distinct ciphertext 
blocks if y is restricted to being a multiple of 8.
Replacing individual blocks without garbling the plaintext is possible if the attacker can deter-
mine the start and end position of the individual blocks where the modification will occur. Any 
block being replaced will have to be replaced with a block of the same length; otherwise, the 
block and all subsequent plaintext blocks will be garbled. The probability of an attacker determin-
ing the start and end of the ith block is 1/(b2(i-1)). (The probability of guessing the start position of 
the ith block is 1/(b(i-1)) and the probability of guessing the length, yi, of the ith block is 1/b.) 
Splicing is even more difficult than replacing individual blocks. If two ciphertexts are being 
spliced together, the individual block lengths of the result must be the same as the lengths corre-
sponding to the key. If a block is removed, the block boundaries for all subsequent blocks will not 
correspond to the boundaries used in encryption and the remaining plaintext will be garbled.
p1: b+y1 p2: b+y2 p3: b+y3 pn: b+yn…
c2: b+y2 c3: b+y3 cn: b+yn
Ek(p1) Ek(p2) Ek(p3) Ek(pn)…
…c1: b+y1
Figure 10: Elastic ECB Mode
Elastic ECB mode is aimed at applications where at least two b-bit blocks are available when en-
crypting all but the last block so the block size can be varied, with y set to any value in the range 
of 0 to b. Elastic ECB mode may require a greater amount of computation than ECB due to the 
need to compute the yi's from the key and due to varying the block length. Overall encryption 
time compared to ECB may or may not increase because the longer block lengths will result in 
fewer blocks to encrypt. The total number of rounds required of the elastic ECB mode to encrypt 
nb bits, for some integer n > 0, will depend on the n,b and yi values.
To illustrate how elastic ECB mode reduces patterns, the number of times two or more identical 
blocks occur within a file was determined when using 16-byte blocks and (16+Y)-byte blocks, 
where Y is an integer between 0 and 16 that varies per block. We focused the tests on files where 
patterns are present. English text such as news articles and research papers are unlikely to have 
repeated phrases that align on 128-bit block boundaries [4]. In contrast, patterns are likely to ap-
pear in the ciphertext produced by ECB mode when encrypting structured files where the format 
of the content results in patterns, such as email logs. 
We used files where repetitions of plaintext were frequent but not intentionally aligned on 16-byte 
boundaries. These files consisted of emails, email logs (SMTP header information) and a log of 
visitors (IP addresses, and related information) to a web site. The email consisted of emails be-
tween three people. The emails were generally short and included forwarded emails but no at-
tached files or images. 160,000 bytes were used from each file. When using elastic ECB mode, 
the block sizes were determined randomly using the key value as a seed to a random number gen-
erator. We ran 10 trials, each with a different key. The results are summarized in Table 3. A block 
counted as a match if it was identical to any previous block in the file. The maximum number of 
matches (greatest percent) out of the 10 trials is reported for elastic ECB mode. The number of 





Percent of Blocks 
Counting  as a Match 
with ECB
(10,000 total blocks)
Percent of Blocks 
Counting as a Match
 with ECB
(max over 10 trials).
emails 13.62% 0.85%
email log 34.38% 9.46%
web log 38.70% 7.49%
 
Table 3: Percent of Matching Blocks 
in ECB Mode vs Elastic ECB Mode
4 Conclusions
The constructions of the elastic versions of AES, Camellia, MISTY1 and RC6 illustrate how to 
apply the method for creating variable-length block ciphers. By applying the statistical tests used 
in NIST's AES competition, we conclude that there is no obvious flaw in the design because the 
level of randomness of the ciphertext produced by each of the elastic versions is consistent with 
the level required in the AES competition. The workload of the elastic version of a cipher is pro-
portional to the block size, with the number of rounds increasing as the block size increases. The 
performance benefit from using the elastic version of a block cipher depends on the original ci-
pher and the exact implementation. The percent of overhead involved in adding the swap steps, 
whitening and two key-dependent permutations varies based on the number of operations and 
exact implementation of the original cipher. For AES, whose block size is 16 bytes, there is a sig-
nificant performance benefit when using the elastic version to encrypt blocks up to 25 bytes in 
length using an implementation of AES that requires little memory; whereas, there is no perform-
ance benefit when using a memory intensive implementation that consists entirely of table look-
ups and XORs. For Camellia, whose block size is 16 bytes, there is a performance benefit when 
using the elastic version for block sizes up to 19 bytes in length when the initial and final key-
dependent permutations are not included. For MISTY1, whose block size is 8 bytes, there is a 
performance benefit when using the elastic version for block sizes up to 12 bytes. For RC6 with a 
block size of 16 bytes, there is a performance benefit when using the elastic version for blocks up 
to 20 bytes in length. The elastic versions offer a performance benefit over previous methods  that 
treat the block cipher as a black box and apply it multiple times. 
The ability to encrypt variable-length blocks allows new modes of encryption to be designed. We 
proposed two ways of using variable-length blocks to create new modes. Elastic Chaining in-
volves processing blocks in a manner such that bits from the ith ciphertext block become part of 
the (i+1)st  plaintext block.  When  encrypting  a  sequence of  blocks,  y  bits  from  the  previous 
ciphertext block are prepended to the current plaintext block to form a (b+y)-bit block. This mode 
prevents the block-wise adaptive attacks to which  CBC is subject and, compared to CBC, results 
in more garbled plaintext blocks when attempting to splice or otherwise alter ciphertext blocks. 
Elastic ECB mode is ECB mode with key bits determining each block's size such that the block 
size varies across the blocks. This significantly reduces the probability that patterns are detected, 
even in highly repetitious data. Furthermore, insertion, removal or rearrangement of blocks re-
quires determining the start position and length of the blocks. These proposals for modes of en-
cryption are intended as initial concepts to demonstrate additional potential uses of elastic block 
ciphers and require further analysis.
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